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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the relation between equity market value and the expense of employee stock 
bonus that is disclosed but not recognized under Taiwan’s law. Employing the regression analyses, 
and to investigate the effects of employee stock bonus on the firm’s share price. We find that the 
market value of employee stock bonus has a negative effect on the firm’s share price. The result 
indicates the negative side of employee stock bonus is its dilution of the existing shareholders’ 
equity rights. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
he objective of this study is to understand the relation between equity market values and the expense 
of employee stock bonus that is disclose, but not recognized in net income. According to Taiwan’s 
Law of Corporation of 1980, employee stock bonus in Taiwan is treated as an after-tax distribution 
of net income, instead of pretax compensation expense. that is ,but not recognized in net income. Under this 
employee stock bonus plan, employees can get a large amount of rewards in reality with low taxes since employees 
will be taxed on the par value of the stock bonus that is far below the market value. In late nineties, electronic firms 
generally distribute stock bonus to their employees. People in Taiwan, therefore, dreamed of joining the high-tech 
industry. The employee stock bonus plan not only attracts talents to work for industries, but it has also created a 
high-tech legend of Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan (Chen and Wang 2001).
1，2
 Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) 
pointed out that sharing the company’s after-tax earnings with employees may be the most effective way to increase 
a firm’s productivity, both in the short run and in the long run. 
 
Distributing employee stock bonus to employees makes employees become the owner of a firm they work 
for. The bonus plan can encourage employees to stay and serve in the firm, hoping to enhance the operation and to 
raise productivity. Under the employee stock bonus plan, employees not only share the business earnings, but also 
undertake the risk of business. The current accounting in Taiwan treats employee stock bonus as a distribution of 
after-tax earnings at par value of NT$10 per share instead of a tax-deductible expense. Such accounting treatment is 
contradictory to the international accounting practice that treats the fair value of employee stock plan as a 
compensation expense. Since the remuneration expenses of employee stock bonus are not included in the costs of 
production in Taiwan, the U. S. enterprises often accuse their competitors from Taiwan of dumping low-priced 
products to the U. S. In order to fix this problem and to make Taiwan’s accounting treatments synchronizing with 
international standards, Taiwan’s Law of Business Accounting was amended on May 24, 2006 to revise the clause on 
employee bonus and required employee bonuses should be treated as expenses. Considering the possible serious 
impact, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs mandates that employee bonuses shall be treated as compensation 
expenses from January 1, 2008 on. 
                                                 
1 Hsinchu Science Park has already become a place that produces star firms in Taiwan. Total sales volume for firms in this 
science park represented 1.28% of Taiwan’s GDP in 1994, and quickly rose to 7.05% in 2002. 
2 A survey conducted by Chen and Wang (2002) showed that the world market shares of electronics products made in Taiwan are: 
Mice (60%), Main Boards (61%), Keyboards (65%), Scanners (84%), Monitors (58%), Network Interface Cards (39%), Power 
Supplies (66%), VGA Cards (31%), Notebooks (40%) and CD-ROMs (34%). 
T 
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Although many studies point out that an employee stock bonus plan can bring economic benefits for the 
business, it also deteriorates shareholders’ equity to a certain extent. The value of employee stock represents a cost 
of generating earnings. We test the relation between share price and the expense of employee stock bonus, 
incremental to net income, equity book value, and expected earnings growth, we predict a negative relation between 
the expense and share price. To obtain data for our tests, we collect the firm with employee stock bonus from firms 
listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from the period 1997-2005. Financial and market data are from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal databanks. We find a significant negative relation between share price and the expense of 
employee stock bonus that is disclosed, but not recognized in net income, after controlling for net income, equity 
book value, and expected earnings growth.   
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we will develop our hypotheses 
based on existing research in employee stock bonus. Section three explains our research methodology. Empirical 
results are illustrated in Section four. Section five expounds our conclusions. 
 
Ⅱ.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
According to the generalized stock valuation model, the price of a firm is determined by discounting its 
future earnings using appropriate discount rates. Thus, accounting earnings are one of the most basic and important 
determinants of stock price. The theoretical “residual income valuation model” proposed by Ohlson (1995) and 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) argued that a firm’s market value can be expressed as the book value plus the present 
value of future abnormal earnings. This theoretical development has important implications for empirical researchers, 
as Ohlson’s model specifies the relationship between stock price and accounting variables such as earnings and the 
book value of a firm.  
 
In the past two decades, more and more U. S. enterprises used stock-based compensation (e.g. employee 
stock option plans)
 
to motivate their employees. Under APB Opinion No. 25, a firm is required to record a 
compensation expense that is equal to the difference between the market value of the shares on the date the option 
was granted to employees and the exercise price of that stock option. However, companies can easily avoid 
recognizing the expense of stock-based compensation by granting options that exercise price is set as the stock price 
on the grant date. In fact, Taiwan’s “employee stock bonus plans” is very similar to the stock option in the U. S. 
However, the accounting treatments between the U. S. and Taiwan are different. According to Taiwan’s Law of 
Corporation, the employee stock bonus plan is regarded as a distribution of after-tax income and therefore incurs no 
recognition as a compensation expense. In October of 1995, the FASB made a concession and issued Statement No. 
123. SFAS No. 123 encourages firms to recognize compensation expenses in the income statement for stock-based 
compensation based on the estimated fair value on the grant (the “fair value method”). As an alternative, a firm can 
choose to use the intrinsic value method under APB Opinion No. 25 and disclose pro-forma net income and EPS as 
if they had used the fair value method. Coller and Higgs (1997) found that the choices of stock option valuation 
models and model variable measurements could result in material differences in compensation expenses even under 
the acceptable procedures of FASB. As a result, it is difficult to compare the information of firms’ employee stock 
options among firms. Espahbodi et al. (2002) documented that firms exhibited significant abnormal returns around 
the issuance of the Exposure Drafts proposing to require recognition of compensation costs in fair value, especially 
for high-tech, high-growth, and start-up firms. Examining firms in the electronic industry in Taiwan from 1995 to 
1998, Chang (1999) showed that stock prices reflected the reported earnings without including the expense of 
employee stock bonus. She conjectured that the privacy and dilution effect of employee stock bonus fail to be 
understood by investors immediately on the announcement date of employee stock bonus. Another explanation was 
that investors might view employee stock bonus as a work incentive for employees and thus compensate for its 
expenses. 
 
From an accounting point of view, when services or products are rendered and revenue is recognized, all 
related expenses shall be recognized in the same period (the “matching principle”). Therefore, compensation costs of 
employee stock bonus must match the revenue recognized in the period when employees are granted to receive the 
bonus. Compensation costs of employee stock bonus should be tied to the improvement in employees’ performance. 
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From the empirical model of Ohlson (1995), we know that:  
 
       ktktttequity RIRIBVEV    110  ．．．．．．．．．．  (1) 
tBV ：book value of equity; 
ktRI  ：forecasts of future residual income. 
 
If a firm distributes employee stock bonus, both stockholders and employees have right to claim on future 
earnings. Therefore, both the book value of equity and future residual incomes must be adjusted to reflect the 
employee compensation costs in order to better estimate the fair value of equity in Equation (1), this leads to 
hypothesis one:  
 
H1： A firm’s equity market value is negatively related with the fair value of employee stock bonus it distributes.  
 
Ⅲ.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A.  Sample And Data 
 
Sample data was drawn from firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and complied in the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) Database from 1997-2005. The initial sample consisted of 6,045 firm-year observations. 
We remove firms with missing value in financial statements or stock price. We eliminate such firms in the banking 
and insurance industries. Taken together, our final sample consists of 772 observations with employee stock bonus 
and 3,073 observations without employee stock bonus.  
 
Table 1 presents the industry distribution for firms used in our analyses. The statistics indicate that the 
electronics industry has the most firms, totaling 222 companies, adopting employee stock bonus plans compared 
with other industries. This represents 72.08% of the all sample firms with employee stock bonus plans. The next one 
is the electrical engineering industry having 17 firms (5.52%), and then the chemical industry with 15 firms (4.87%). 
Companies in the other industries than electronics have fewer firms adopting employee stock bonus plans. Their 
total aggregation was only 54 companies, representing 17.53% (54/308) of our sample firms. 
 
 
Table 1 
 Industry distribution of sample firms 
Industry Description a                            Number        % 
Food                               
Plastics                                        
Textiles                                        
Engineering & Machinery                        
Appliance & Cable 
Chemicals 
Steel & Iron 
Electronics  
Construction 
Other 
Total 
  3           0.97 
  3           0.97 
  5           1.63 
 17           5.52 
  3           0.97 
 15           4.87 
  3           0.97 
222          72.08 
  9           2.93 
 28           9.09  
308         100.00  
a Industry categories are determined by Taiwan Stock Exchange Industry Code as follows: food (12), plastics (13), textiles (14), 
engineering & Machinery (15), appliance & cable (16), chemicals (17), steel & iron (20),  electronics 
(23,24,30-34,52-54,61-62), construction (25), and other (11,18,19,21,26,29, and 99). 
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B.  Model Specification  
 
This study purposes to examine the relationship between a firm’s equity market value and employee stock 
bonus it granted. Since a firm determining to distribute employee stock bonuses definitely has its own reasons, it 
may be these determinants affecting the firm’s market value rather than the fair value of employee stock plan itself. 
If so, then the coefficient of our regression may be biased. In order to avoid this “self-selection bias”, the two-stage 
estimation of Heckman (1976) is used in our study. In the first stage, the determinants of employee stock bonus 
equation are estimated using the probit analysis. In the second stage, the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the first 
stage is included in the second stage regression models to test the hypotheses of this study. 
 
Determinants of adopting an employee stock bonus plan can be explained in the following two 
perspectives:  
 
(1) Incentive consideration 
 
Guay (1999), and Core and Guay (1999) documented that “firm size” and “growth opportunities” are major 
determinants for a firm to grant stock options to its employees for incentive purposes. Prior studies provide many 
variables, such as sales, total assets, and the number of employees, as proxies for the “firm size”. Since employee 
stock bonus plan is an incentive device for employees, the number of employees will affect the degree of incentive. 
Thus, the “firm size” is measured by the number of employees (NO) and the natural log of total assets (LA) in our 
study. Smith and Watts (1992) found that firms with higher growth rates make greater use of stock-based 
compensation plans. Kole (1991) and MacKie-Mason (1990) pointed out that a firm having higher R & D 
expenditures generally has more investment in innovative products for forming a higher barrier to entry. To measure 
a firm’s “growth opportunities”, we use the rate of sales growth (SG) and the ratio of R & D expenditures to sales 
(DTR). In addition, the financial performance of a firm will affect a firm’s willingness to distribute stock bonuses to 
its employees for incentive purpose. The financial performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), which is 
defined as net income before interest and taxes divided by total assets. 
 
(2) Other considerations 
 
Prior studies documented that firms in the new economy usually adopt equity-based compensation plans 
(Espahbodi et al. 2002, Ittner et al. 2003, among others). Our sample also shows that 72.08% of firms in the 
electronics industry adopt employee stock bonus plans. Therefore, a dummy variable（HT）is included in our probit 
model for employee stock bonus to capture the effect of industry, where HT is an indicator variable with a value of 1 
if the firm is in the electronics industry, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The probit model using to estimate the determinants of the employee stock bonus equation is: 
 
Yit = β0  + β1 NOit  + β2 LAit + β3 SGit + β4 DTRit + β5 ROAit  
+ β6 HTit + eit  ．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．(2) 
 
Y
*
 = 1, if Yit  > 0, the firm has an employee stock bonus plan, and 
Y
*
 = 0, if Yit ≤ 0, the firm does not have an employee stock bonus plan. 
NOit：the number of employees for firm i during period t; 
LAit：the natural log of total assets for firm i during period t; 
SGit：the sales growth rate for firm i during period t; 
DTRit：the ratio of R & D expenditures to sales for firm i during period t; 
ROAit：net income before interest and taxes divide by total assets for firm i during period t; 
HTit：Dummy = 1 if the firm is in the electronics industry, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The second stage of the Heckman’s two-stage method solves the “self-selection bias” problem by including 
the inverse Mills ratio generated from the probit model of Equation (2) into the following regression models. In 
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Heckman’s two-stage method, we focus on the following equation model to test our H1 (The firm’s equity market 
value is negatively related to the fair value of employee stock bonus) as follows:  
 
itititititit GWSBONIBVP   43210  ．．．．．．．．（3） 
 
P is share price, BV is equity book value, NI is net income, SBO is the fair value of employee stock bonus, 
and GW is earnings growth opportunity. The primary objective of this study is to explore whether the equity market 
value of a firm is affected by the fair value of employee stock bonus. Based on the economic substance, the 
employee stock bonus shall be accounted for at their fair value and be expensed. Generally, the actual amount of 
employee sock bonus is unknown at year end. However, an investor knowing the current year’s earnings would be 
able to estimate the number of shares of employee stock bonus for the current year by referring to the earnings and 
the number of shares of employee stock bonus distributed in the prior year. The ex-post actual number of employee 
stock bonus distributed is not used to calculate their value because the required deadlines for both annual and the 
first quarterly reports are same on April 30 in Taiwan, share price in such a way will mix the annual and the 
first-quarter earnings information and increase the noise in the department variable. Therefore, we use the expected 
value of employee stock bonus at year-end (the expected number of shares of employee stock bonus times the 
yearend stock price) as the independent variable. In addition, the distribution of employee stock bonus will inflate 
the contributed capital, and dilute the equity right of original shareholders. Therefore, we predict a negative effect 
between the share price and the fair value of employee stock bonus. The expected numbers of shares of employee 
stock bonus to be distributed for the current year is defined as the actual number of shares of employee stock bonus 
distributed for the prior year multiplied by the ratio of the current income to last year’s income. The fair value of 
employee stock bonus per share (SBO) to be distributed for the current year is calculated by multiplying the ending 
stock price with the ratio of the expected number of shares of employee stock bonus to the sum of the ending 
number of shares of common stock outstanding and that of employee stock bonus.  
 
In the knowledge economy, the value of an enterprise depends on the quality of its human resources, the 
ability to innovate, and R&D, especially in high-tech industries.
3
 The employee stock bonus system adopted by 
many firms in Taiwan is used to attract and retain valuable employees and eventually to create shareholder value.
4
 If 
the company can maintain its growth, the shareholders can make some sacrifice in their equities in exchange of 
greater reward. Adopting an employee stock bonus plan in this case will be a win-win situation. However, if the 
operation of the company is not good, the more shares distributed and the higher the fair value of employee stock 
bonus are, the more value investors’ equities will lose. The market to book ratio of equity and Tobin’s Q have been 
used to measure the growth opportunities in literature. Fama and French (1993), and Collins and Kothari (1989), 
employed the ratio of market value of equity to its book value as the proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. If a 
firm has higher growth opportunities, it will have a higher expected equity return and thus a higher market to book 
ratio. In this study, the ratio of market to book value of equity is used as the proxy of growth opportunities. Yoon and 
Starks (1995) pointed out that the calculation of Tobin’s Q faced difficulties in terms of its data requirements and 
computational effort. We do not use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of the growth opportunities in our study.  
 
Ⅳ.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our sample is composed from firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from the period 1997-2005. 
Financial and market data are from the Taiwan Economic Journal databanks. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics 
for 772 firm-year observations. It reveals that the mean of fair value of employee stock bonus per share is 0.5698, 
with a maximum value of 13.3765.
5
 Therefore, companies are apt to ignore the cost employee stock bonus to a firm, 
and thus distribute employee stock bonus generously.  
                                                 
3  Ke (2002 ), Accounting Research Monthly 174: 14-15 
4  Ma (1998) pointed out that the United Microelectronics Corp. distributed employee stock bonus over 15 years, resulting in an 
average of 0.43% dilution on contributed capitals per annum, and created about 14.5 times of ROE reduction per annum. 
5  Wang (2002) pointed out that the average ratio of fair value of employee stock bonus to the total contributed capital was about 
1.2% in 2002 in Taiwan. The average ratio of employee stock bonus to total capitalization of profits was about 15%. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables ( N=772 ) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
P 33.222 38.9756 11.8 21.26 770.4 
BV 18.0099 5.5761 8.78 16.32 48.61 
NI 2.3684 1.9949 -1.05 1.76 10.6 
SBO 0.5698 1.1275 0.0002 0.2093 13.3765 
GW 2.2879 1.4867 0.2780 1.8974 11.0928 
Definition of variables: 
P: the share price;  
BV: the equity book value;  
NI: the firm’s net income; 
SBO: the expected fair value of employee stock bonus per share; 
GW: earnings growth opportunities, defined as a firm’s market to book value measured at the beginning year. 
 
 
For the basic uni-variate analyses, we first computed the Pearson correlations for variables used in this 
study to assess whether employee stock bonus influences share price. Table 3 provides the correlation matrix of 
Pearson for all variables. As expected, Pearson correlations among the major variables are significantly different 
from zeros. The share price (P) are significantly and positively correlated with book value (BV) and net income (NI) 
of the firm. Also, the correlation between share price and fair value of employee stock bonus per share (SBO) is 
negative as expected, but not significant. The growth opportunities (GW) is insignificantly, and positively, correlated 
with share price. The coefficients on fair value of employee stock bonuses per share with net income and growth 
opportunities are significantly positive in Spearman correlations. This implies that the more growth opportunities 
and the higher the firms’ risks are, the higher the fair value of employee stock bonuses will be, and vice versa. 
 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlations（N=772） 
 P BV NI SBO GW 
P 1     
      
BV 0.324*** 1    
 (0.000)     
NI 0.336*** 0.355*** 1   
 (0.000) (0.000)    
SBO -0.061 -0.075 0.202*** 1  
 (0.269) (0.170) (0.000)   
GW 0.026 0.316*** 0.516*** 0.087** 1 
 (0.476) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016)  
***, **, * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
See table 2 for definition of variables. 
 
 
B. Regression Analysis  
 
Probit regression 
 
 This section presents our empirical results about the effect of the fair value of employee stock bonus on the 
equity market value of a firm. Table 4 reports results of the probit analysis. The coefficient of industry variable（HT）
is significantly positive, meaning the electronics industry prefers to adopt employee stock bonus plans. We find that 
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the coefficient of the number of employees（NO）is negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that 
the number of employees of a firm with employee stock bonus is less than that for a firm without it. The fewer the 
number of employees a firms has, the higher the motivation effect of employee stock bonus will be. The coefficient 
of a firm’s total assets（LA）is significantly positive, possibly due to firms with employee stock bonus being in the 
capital-intensive electronics industry. Or alternatively, large firms tend to adopt employee stock bonus plans than 
small firms do. The coefficient of a firm’s total assets（LA）is significantly positive, possibly due to firms with 
employee stock bonus being in the capital-intensive electronics industry. Or alternatively, large firms tend to adopt 
employee stock bonus plans than small firms do. We find a positive coefficient of R&D expenditures (DTR) and a 
negative coefficient for sales growth (SG), both are insignificant. In addition, the coefficient for return on assets 
(ROA) is significantly positively, suggesting that better performance encourages the adoption of an employee stock 
bonus plan. 
 
 
Table 4 
Probit Regression Results for the Determinant of Employee Stock Bonus Grants 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient Chi-Square p-value 
Intercept  β0 = -5.182
*** 53.58 0.000 
NO － β1 = -0.001
*** 9.60 0.001 
LA － β2 = 0.218
*** 23.12 0.000 
SG ＋ β3 = -0.003 0.13 0.721 
DTR ＋ β4 = 0.004 0.11 0.745 
ROA ＋ β5 = 0.052
*** 104.55 0.000 
HT ＋ β6 = 1.445
*** 250.86 0.000 
       
Log likelihood  -668.89 
 
   
LR statistic  539.78     
N  3845     
 
***, **, * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Definitions of variables: 
Y: equal to 1for firm with employee stock bonus, and 0 otherwise; 
NO: the number of employees;  
LA: the natural log of total asset; 
SG: the rate of sales growth; 
DTR: the ratio of R & D expenditure to sales; 
ROA: the rate of return on assets, which is defined as net income before interest and taxes divide by total assets; 
HT: industry type dummy, the electronics industry equals 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
After the selection equation for employee stock bonus is established by the first stage of Heckman’s 2-stage 
model, it can be used to estimate the probability of a firm adopting employee stock bonus and calculate the inverse 
Mill’s ratio（LAM）. The inverse Mill’s ratio represents the self-selection correction term to solve the “self-selection 
bias” in regression models. In the second stage, the inverse Mill’s ratio is included in our regression models to 
determine whether or not employee stock bonus reduces the share price of a firm. 
 
Tests of H1 
 
This study examines the relationship between a firm’s equity market value and employee stock bonus it 
granted. Our empirical results are shown in Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis of the Impact of Employee Stock Bonus on equity market value 
Variable    Predicted sign            Coefficient            t-value       p-value          VIF 
Intercept  α  = -0.248*  -1.71 0.000 0 
BV ＋ β0 =  0.890
** 2.55 0.011 7.955 
NI ＋ β1 = 3.626
**  3.36 0.001 1.778 
SBO  － β2 = -3.345
*** -3.59 0.001 5.245 
GW ＋ β3 = 0.517
* 1.46 0.079 8.561 
LAM  γ = -0.031*** -1.20 0.231 1.013 
        
Adjusted R2    0.649    
N   
 
772    
 
***, **, * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
See table 2 for definition of variables. 
 
It reveals that the model’s adjusted R2 is 0.649. As expected, the regression coefficients of book value (BV) 
and net income（NI）are significantly positive. These statistics suggest that there exists a negative effect of fair value 
of employee stock bonus (SBO) on a firm’s share price. These results are consistent with our H1. The higher the fair 
value of employee stock bonus is, the lower a firm’s share price will be. Accounting information is important to help 
investors making predictions about the firm’s future earnings and it will affect stock prices accordingly. Employee 
stock bonus is distributed from current profit or retained earnings in Taiwan. Under current accounting treatment in 
Taiwan, employee stock bonus is recorded and taxed at the par value of NT$10 and regarded as a distribution of 
after-tax profits instead of a compensation cost. The positive side of this treatment is to attract and retain talented 
people by employee stock bonus. An employee will work harder to maximize his personal interest since he has a 
stake in the firm’s shares. The negative side of employee stock bonus is its dilution of the existing shareholders’ 
equity rights.  Unless an employee works hard enough to increase a firm’s value exceeding the dilution effect of 
employee stock bonus, the wealth of existing shareholders will shrink. However, no matter how employee stock 
bonus is presented in the financial statements, stock price will reflect all information in an efficient market any way, 
including the fair value information of employee stock bonus. Our empirical evidence shows that firms with 
employee stock bonus significantly weaken the firm’s share price. The regression coefficient of growth opportunities 
(GW) is significantly positive, suggesting that the ability of residual income valuation model to explain a stock price 
is higher when a firm’s growth opportunities are better. That is, companies with higher growth opportunities will 
have larger equity market value, which is consistent with our expectation.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Our study examines the impact of employee stock bonus on the equity market value for firms listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange. Truly, employee stock bonus plan has a motivational effect for employees. Due to 
un-recognizing treatment on the fair value of employee stock bonus as compensation expense in Taiwan, accounting 
earnings thus includes noise and impairs the relationship between earnings and stock price. Our empirical evidence 
indicates a significantly negative effect of fair value of employee stock bonus on share price for firms in Taiwan. 
There exists a significantly positive relationship between growth opportunities and share price. These statistics 
imply that the explanatory ability of earnings for stock prices increases when the firm’s growth opportunities are 
higher.  
 
The empirical results show that the fair value of employee stock bonus reduces a firm’s equity market price. 
This conclusion can help designing an incentive mechanism to attract and retain talented employees and, at the same 
time, protect shareholders’ equity rights.  
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